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Abstract
The results of the 2011–12 Egyptian elections highlight the gap that exists between the “emotional”
and the “rational” conceptions of the people and its representation. If the revolutionary moment had
allowed some organizations to temporarily gain legitimacy to speak in the name of the people, these
organizations  have  been  ill-equipped  to  compete  within  the  existing  structure  of  the  social
cleavages. This article examines the electoral system, the lack of resources at the disposal of the
revolutionaries, the polarization of the political field around the religious issue, and the difficulties
involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism.
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The  disappointing  results  of  the  political  parties  and  coalitions  built  upon  revolutionary
organizations and networks during the various electoral consultations following the Arab uprisings
of  2010–11 highlight  the gap that  exists  between the  emotional-revolutionary and the rational-
democratic conceptions of the people. This article sets out to examine the impact of the institutional
rules and of the political polarization on the existence and depth of such a gap, drawing on the
definition  of  “the  people”  used  by  Hamit  Bozarslan,  who  has  examined  the  creation  of  a
“revolutionary coalition” in the different countries involved in the Arab Spring. This involved the
building of a “people”, that is to say an alliance of the centre and the peripheries, the middle class
and the working class, the young and the old, the men and the women (Bozarslan, 2015). Despite a
common  will,  especially  among  the  intellectuals,  to  picture  the  revolutionary  vanguard  as  a
coalition of young people from the middle classes (Mellor, 2014; Sabaseviciute, 2016), the notion
of people –as in “the people want the fall of the regime”– was used when referring to a broader
coalition  gathered  around  this  vanguard.  This  revolutionary  coalition  was  born  into  the
revolutionary moment, and its existence explains why all the opposition movements took part in the
Arab uprisings, regardless of their individual ideological stances (Bozarslan, 2015). This concept of
the people as an entity transcending social divisions contrasts with the concept of democracy as a
perpetual  competition  between  political  parties  as  they  seek  to  represent  the  existing  social
cleavages, such as the opposition between the social classes, the centre and the peripheries, the
religions  and  the  state,  the  urban  and  the  rural  world  (Lipset  &  Rokkan,  1967).  It  has  been
established, for instance, that the centre/periphery and the urban/rural cleavages played a major role
in the Egyptian elections of 2011–12 (Rougier & Bayoumi, 2015).
If  the revolutionary moment had allowed some organizations to  temporarily  gain legitimacy to
speak in the name of “the people” in the sense of Bozarslan, these organizations have been ill-
equipped to compete within the structure of the social cleavages that exist in the contemporary Arab
world. Yaghi (2018) argues that, in the case of the Egyptian elections of 2011-12, this failure is due
mainly to three factors:  the lack of resources and organizational structures of the revolutionary
youth groups; the ideological divisions among them; the disinterest  of the youth in general for
political parties. The present article will put the argument a step further, identifying four types of
factor impeding the effort of the revolutionary youth groups to compete into politics: those related
to  the  rules  of  the  game;  those  stemming  from parties’ power  resources;  those  related  to  the
structure of social  cleavages (this  explains the difficulty  of  the revolutionaries to  mobilize any
constituency  into  the  ballot  boxes,  not  only  the  youth  electorate);  and  those  inherent  to  the
contradictions between street politics and electoral politics (this includes the ideological diversity
among the youth revolutionaries, which was a necessary condition for them to mobilize people on
Tahrir, but revealed itself a handicap during the elections). 
The present article will focus on the campaign of the electoral coalition called “The Revolution
Continues” (al-thawra mustamira), during the 2011–12 parliamentary elections in Egypt, when it
managed to attract only 2.8 per cent of the vote. Based upon fieldwork carried out in three of the
electoral districts during the elections (Cairo Central, Suez and Tanta), and upon several interviews
with candidates and members of the revolutionary coalition campaign, this paper seeks to examine
the  difficulties  encountered  by the revolutionary  organizations  as  they  sought  to  represent  “the
people”,  in  an  institutional  context  where  the  rules  of  the  game  had  been  defined  by  their
adversaries, namely the military and the Islamist political forces1. The goal of this discussion is not
to  analyze  the  influence  of  the  youth  organizations’ strategies  on  the  transformation  process
(Abdalla,  2016;  Alwazir,  2016),  neither  does  it  aim  to  assess  the  impact  of  the  political
transformations on the youth organizations and their strategies (Ryan, 1994). The objective here is
to  show  how  a  given  strategy  aimed  at  representing  the  people  can  be  effective  during  the
1 Pro-military, old regime and Islamist forces agreed to support the text submitted to the referendum of 19 March
2011, in order to set out the main stages of the political transition. Liberal and revolutionary forces opposed this
roadmap, arguing that the transition process should be allowed more time, and that the planned steps should be
reversed (e.g. the writing of a constitution before the election of a Parliament)
revolutionary  moment  and reveals  itself  to  be  counter-productive  in  the  electoral  process.  This
contradiction relies on the dual nature of the people, an entity united beyond its pluralism in a time
of crisis and “desectorization” (Dobry, 1986), and a divided body in a time of election. We will first
point  out  that  the  so-called  “rational”  vision  of  the  people,  as  expressed  through  democratic
procedures, is highly dependent on institutional rules, and that these rules advantaged large political
organizations during the 2011–12 elections. Then, we will recall which were the political forces
competing in these elections, and examine the nature of their respective resources. Relying almost
exclusively on revolutionary legitimacy, “the Revolution Continues” coalition had a hard time as it
sought to face up to strong religious movements and wealthy liberal political parties in a fair and
free electoral contest. In addition, the polarization of the public debate and the political field at that
time  contributed  to  the  marginalization  of  the  revolutionary  candidates,  who  were  positioning
themselves  essentially  on  secondary  and  tertiary  cleavages,  but  were  almost  inaudible  on  the
primary concern of  the electorate,  i.e.  the  religious  issue2.  Lastly,  the  practical  and ideological
difficulties involved in conciliating between the electoral campaign and street activism handicapped
the coalition’s candidates.
The Effects of the Electoral System on the Ability to Represent the People
In  order  to  understand  the  challenge  faced by the  revolutionary  coalition,  one  should  start  by
undertaking an overview of the electoral system. Indeed, this system was new in the context of
Egyptian political life, and also extremely complex, due to the large number of contradictory forces
and factors that were operating in relation to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
when it issued the electoral law. Despite all the myths surrounding the democratic exercise of free
and fair  elections,  the representation-mandate is not as easy to grasp as it seems, and the legal
representation  of  the  people  in  Parliament  can  be  very  different  from one  electoral  system to
another, regardless of any other disruptive factors, such as fraud and violence. The majoritarian
systems, for instance, are viewed as less representative, because of their lack of proportionality in
relation to the choice of the voters and actual political representation. In addition, single member
district  (SMD)  systems  induce  lower  incentives  for  participation,  and  reinforce  a  clientelistic
attitude, because of the close proximity between the elector and his representative in Parliament
(Reynolds & Sisk, 1998). On the other hand, proportional representation (PR) systems present a
higher degree of fidelity between the will of the electorate and the allocation of seats. As a result,
they provide higher incentives to vote, as well as favouring political parties at the expense of the
traditional notables. In addition, PR systems ensure that a greater number of parties win legislative
seats than is possible in SMD systems, which are regarded as favouring bipartisan systems. These
are  the  well-known  laws  established  by  Duverger  (Duverger,  1986).  As  a  consequence,  SMD
systems produce stronger majorities and more stable governments than PR ones. 
From 1990 to 2010, the Egyptian electoral system was a strictly majoritarian one. Significantly, the
opposition parties boycotted the 1990 elections, due to the contested boundaries of the electoral
districts. According to observers, all the following elections (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010)
were dominated by notables, and by patron-client relations, despite the oversight of the judicial
branch in 2000 and 2005 (Gamblin, 1997; Singerman, 1997; Ben Néfissa & Arafat, 2005; Haenni,
2005, Vannetzel, 2008; Kohstall & Vairel, 2011). During this period, the ability to co-opt powerful
individuals in each of the electoral districts became the main feature of the National Democratic
Party (NDP). At that time, 80 per cent of the candidates were officially labeled as independent of
any political party. This rate remained more or less the same until the revolution, along with other
characteristics of these elections: e.g. the large number of candidates, the stiff competition between
2 This point is closely related to the previous one, the hierarchy of social cleavages having been shaped at least
partially by the distribution of resources by the old regime. Indeed, the control of workers unions (and also by a
lesser extent of professional and student unions) by the state contributes to explain the weakness of the left, when
the relative autonomy left to the Islamist religious and charity organizations and to the liberals (at  least to the
members of the Wafd party) under Mubarak played a major role in their electoral successes following the revolution
(Resta, 2018).
them, and the integration of the victorious independents within the hegemonic NDP after the results
were proclaimed (Ben Néfissa & Arafat, 2005: 143–4). In the 1995-elected People’s Assembly, 99
of the 318 NDP members of Parliament (MP) were elected as independents, i.e. 22 per cent of the
total of the seats in this assembly (Al-Sayyid, 1997: 14). In 2005, 195 independents were elected,
constituting 45 per cent of the 432 MPs, as against only 141 official NDP candidates (33 per cent).
170 of these independents ultimately joined the NDP, providing the hegemonic party with 311 seats,
along with 72 per cent of the assembly (Zahrân, 2006). 
Consequently,  the growing number of independents  elected to  Parliament never  endangered the
hegemony of the NDP. Actually, they were independents mainly because the NDP had chosen to
support someone else’s candidacy in their district. Under such a system, parliamentary elections
became  a  competitive  mechanism,  through  which  the  hegemonic  party  allowed  the  voters  to
designate the most powerful man in each district,  without threatening its  own domination (Ben
Néfissa & Arafat, 2005). In doing so, these elections facilitated the objective weighting of power of
the different notables who were in competition for each seat. This power was measured by their
ability to mobilize voters, depending on the different means at their disposal (wealth, the number of
employees, familial or tribal loyalties, etc.) In this configuration, the NDP was not a mere party, but
rather a national web, which had the capacity to gather together all the local networks offering
allegiance to the regime. So, the central power was able to gain its legitimacy from its ability to
coordinate and organize the social power that was present in these networks for its own benefit, as
embodied in the NDP MPs.
The removal of Hosni Mubarak (11 February 2011), followed by the dissolution of the NDP by
court order (16 April 2011), led to the disorganization of these networks, and temporarily deprived
them of their ability to act at a national level. Nevertheless, they did not disappear, and one of the
most crucial questions at that time was in relation to the new political parties’ ability to defeat these
networks in the elections. On 30 May 2011, the SCAF published an electoral law project, proposing
a mixed electoral system for parliamentary elections, one third of the seats being elected through a
PR system, and the remaining two thirds by the SMD system. The political parties thus reclaimed a
higher degree of PR, which was supposed to advantage them to the detriment of the notables of the
old regime. On 7 July, the government presented a new project, planning to elect one half of the
People’s Assembly by means of a PR system and the other half by the SMD system. Finally, a
definitive law was adopted on 24 September 2011, reversing the initially proposed distribution of
seats: only one third of the assembly would be elected by the SMD system and the remaining two
thirds by a PR system.
Mixed electoral systems can be defined as “electoral systems that provide voters two votes for the
legislature: one for a party list in a proportional representation (PR) tier and one for a candidate in a
single-member district (SMD) tier” (Moser & Scheiner, 2004, p. 576; see also Sartori, 2001, p. 99).
Such  systems  are  generally  regarded  as  the  best  way  to  satisfy  two  contrary  imperatives:
representative justice and governing capacity (Dunleavy & Margetts, 1995), but the Egyptian mixed
system of 2011 has been on the opposite described as failing to produce a pluralistic assembly able
to build consensus (Tavana, 2012)3. Lastly, scholars have focused on the “contamination effects”,
i.e. how PR and SMD proprieties tend to interfere with each other (Herron & Nishikawa, 2001; Cox
and Schoppa, 2002; Moser & Scheiner, 2004). Henceforth, we have to focus on the district level in
order to understand the effects of such systems (Sartori, 1986; Cox, 1997). For instance, it is now
established that in PR systems, the higher the magnitude of the district –and thus its size–, the
greater the degree of proportionality and the number of political parties represented in Parliament
(Taagepera & Shugart,  1989; Lijphart,  1994). Also, given the smaller number of representatives
elected through the SMD system, the size of each district has to be larger in a mixed electoral
3 In contrast, it  is worth noting that Rashîd al-Ghanûshi, the leader of the Tunisian Islamist movement Ennahda,
pushed for the adoption of a full PR system in his country in 2011, in order to avoid a domination of his own party
over the Parliament, and to favour the formation of a governmental coalition bringing together Islamist and Secular
forces (Stepan, 2018).
system than in a full majoritarian system.
Thus, in 2011, one of the unexpected effects of the last-minute compromise which determined the
proportion of each system in the Egyptian parliamentary elections, was that the lower the number of
seats elected by the SMD system, the bigger the average size of each district became. Previously,
the Egyptian electoral map was divided into 222 districts; this time there were only 83, almost three
times bigger on average than the previous ones. As the huge size of such districts was far beyond
the  traditional  influence  zone  of  most  of  the  notables,  their  individual  means  were  largely
insufficient to campaign at the level of the whole district. Consequently, they had no choice but to
look for the support of the only organizations powerful enough to campaign and mobilize voters at
such a level: namely the political parties4.  The result was that 508 representatives were elected to
the People’s Assembly, with 332 elected by the PR system and 166 by the SMD system –with 10
being  appointed  by  the  executive  branch.  Yet,  in  practice,  it  was  impossible  for  independent
candidates to compete for the two thirds of seats that were allotted through the PR system. Hence,
they could only try to win one third of the 498 seats, i.e. 166 (Hasan, 2012). Egypt’s electoral map
was thus divided into 46 districts for the PR vote (meaning an average of 7.2 representatives per
district),  and 83 districts for the SMD system. Indeed, two representatives were elected in each
district, one of them at least being a worker or a peasant.
Given this, these first post-revolutionary elections allowed the emergence of new political players,
and 81.2 per cent of the members of this People’s Assembly were elected for the first time, this rate
being around 62 per cent during the three previous elections (Abû Rîda, 2012). Moreover, of the 23
political parties represented inside this assembly, 19 had not existed or had been banned before the
revolution. Generally speaking, political parties were the real winners of these elections (Steuer,
2012), and only 22 MPs ran as independents, meaning 4.4 per cent of the new representatives5.
Even, if we take into account the 166 seats elected under the SMD system, only 13.3 per cent of
them  were  won  by  independent  candidates.  These  results  contrast  sharply  with  the  previous
elections, and also with the weakness of political parties under the previous regime.
To summarize, the 2011 electoral law exercised a very significant influence on the results of the
elections, contributing to the removal of the notables of the old regime, thus benefiting the political
organizations, particularly the most powerful among them, i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood Freedom
and Justice party and the Salafist Nour party. Additionally, the mixed electoral system facilitated the
expression of the plurality and diversity of the people within Parliament, even if the weakest parties
were disadvantaged compared to the potential results of a full PR system (Tavana, 2012). But by
doing so, it contributed to the exacerbation of the divisions between the people to the point where
they would become irreconcilable in the future. Lastly, this particular electoral system advantaged
the political organizations that had access to important resources, among them the claim to be the
representatives of the people was not the most powerful.
4 Actually,  Sarah  Ben Néfissa  and  Alâ  Al-dîn  Arafat  noted  a  similar  phenomena concerning  the  only  previous
elections organized under a mixed system in this country, i.e. the 1987 ones. However, they did not develop the
argument (Ben Néfissa & Arafat, 2005, p. 142).
5 As a matter of fact, the Higher Constitutional Court dissolved the elected Assembly on 14 June 2012, because of the
alleged unfairness of this system toward independent candidates. In particular, it objected to the fact that party
members could stand in the election as individual candidates for the seats appointed by the SMD system, giving
them an unfair advantage over independent candidates. It is interesting to observe that the Egyptian constitutional
judge considered the local notables to be at least as legitimate as the political parties in relation to expressing the
popular will. This conception is commonly shared by many institutional players in Egypt, and this may explain why
–in the new political context born from the ousting of President Muhammad Morsy on 3 July 2013– the committee
of ten experts appointed to propose amendments to the 2012 Constitution suggested a movement back to a full
SMD system for subsequent parliamentary elections. Eventually, the 2015 parliamentary elections were organized
again through a mixed electoral system, but with a higher share of SMD seats (4/5). Consequently, most of the MPs
elected during this election were independent candidates (circa 60 per cent).
The Different Competing Forces and the Resources at their Disposal
Many political parties and coalitions entered these elections. The most powerful organization was
the still illegal, but tolerated, Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which had established, during the few
months following the fall of Mubarak, a political party called the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).
The Muslim Brothers tried at  first  to  gather around them a national unity coalition,  their  main
partner in this attempt being a liberal and secular organization, the Wafd party. The goal of the
coalition was to solidify and make durable the unity of the Egyptian people, as had been established
during the eighteen days of the uprising against Mubarak. They sought to achieve this objective by
bringing together the main political forces, thus representing all the ideological families coexisting
within Egyptian society. The alliance between the champion of the Islamist camp, the MB, and the
oldest  and greatest  secular  party  was supposed to  constitute  the axis  of  this  national  coalition,
alongside other Islamist, liberal, and even nationalist organizations. But the Wafd and the MB failed
to agree on the allocation of the seats on the lists of candidates for the PR districts, leading the
former  to  withdraw from the  coalition.  Eventually,  the  Salafist  political  organizations,  and the
Islamo-centrist Wasat party, also decided to leave the alliance with the MB. Nevertheless, the FJP
gathered around itself a dozen small political parties and independents from different ideological
strands, in the so-called Democratic Coalition. Given the respective weight of the different partners,
the Democratic Coalition was mainly a vehicle for the MB, but the presence of liberal parties (such
as the Tomorrow of the Revolution Party) and Nasserite organizations (such as Karâma) within the
ranks of this alliance, allowed its leaders to present it as a symbolic embodiment of the unity of the
people.
In this regard, the existence of a Salafist bloc helped the Democratic Coalition to occupy the centre
of the political field, i.e.  between the secular forces and the advocates of an Islamic state. The
Salafist  coalition  was  lead  by  the  Nour  Party,  the  political  branch  of  the  Salafist  Call.  This
organization, created during the 1970s in Alexandria, became the most powerful Salafist movement
in Egypt despite, or maybe because of, its low profile policy. It spectacularly entered the political
field after the dismissal of Mubarak, by the creation of the Nour Party, officially recognized on the
12 June  2011,  only  six  days  after  the  FJP.  This  party  allied  itself  with  the  Authenticity  Party,
representing  the  Cairene  Salafist  arena,  and the  Building  and Development  Party,  the  political
branch of the once terrorist organization, the  Gamâ‘a Islâmiyya, with a powerful power-base in
Middle and Upper Egypt (Lacroix, 2012). Just like the MB, the Salafists were able to rely on their
large network of religious preachers, schools and charity organizations, in order to mobilize the
electorate. This electoral bloc represented an  identity vision of the Egyptian people as part of the
Islamic Umma.
The secular camp was represented by the Wafd on the one hand, and by the Egyptian Bloc on the
other. The latter is a coalition of three political parties, the biggest of them being the Free Egyptian
Party, a neo-liberal organization created after the revolution as a result of the inspiration of a Coptic
tycoon, Naguib Sawiris, the owner of the big telecommunication company, Orascom. Its main ally
was the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, a centre-left organization, built after the departure of
Mubarak by collaboration between scholars and artists. Lastly, the Unionist party was the smallest
and the oldest party within the Egyptian Bloc. Born in 1977 from the leftist wing of the former
unique Nasserite party, it relies mainly on its strong base among the official trade-union federation
of Egyptian workers. Altogether, these three political parties proved themselves to be capable of
mobilizing white-collar employees from the private sector through the Sawiris networks, blue-collar
workers from state-owned companies, as well as students and artists. In addition, Sawiris was at that
time the owner of a television channel, OnTV. These three parties were also popular among the
Coptic electorate, as they represented one of the strongest opponents to the Islamist coalitions. On
its side, the Wafd also benefited from long and well-established popularity among the Christian
voters, and its president was also a business tycoon, Sayyid Badawi, who also possessed his own
television channel, Al-Hayyât. Furthermore, unlike the Egyptian Bloc, the Wafd was able to reach
the countryside through its network of notables all across the country. This camp represented yet
another  definition  of  the Egyptian  people,  i.e.  as  a  nation bringing together  both Muslims and
Christians.
Lastly, even though the NDP had been disbanded by a court ruling on 16 April 2011, its former
members had not retired from politics, and several political parties were trying to engage with its
heritage. The Reform of Development Party, led by Mohammad Anwar al-Sadat, had been created
before the revolution, and at that time represented a liberal attempt to reform the regime from the
inside.  After the revolution,  it  was often presented as a recycling bin for ex-NDP members.  In
addition, a number of other political parties were –or were to become– mere offshoots of the former
hegemonic party,  such as  the Egypt  Nationalist  Party,  the Freedom Party and the Conservative
Party. These organizations did not try to build coalitions, but competed against each other in the
election.  Nevertheless,  they  still  relied  on  some  of  the  old  networks  of  notables  previously
associated with the NDP. From an ideological point of view, this political family not only regarded
the Egyptian people as a nation, but also as an immature people, needing the tutelage of the security
apparatus.
These  different  competing groupings  all  had a  number of  powerful  resources  at  their  disposal,
mainly religious, financial and organizational in nature. Regarding symbolic resources, the ex-NDP
could proclaim their previous experience in the government of the country, while the Salafist, as
well as the MB, could both pretend to be the “true Muslims”. But, at that time, the revolution still
represented  a  really  important  source  of  legitimacy  (Sabaseviciute,  2013),  with  many  political
players trying to tap into it by claiming to represent the will and the unity of the people, as had been
witnessed during the eighteen days of the uprising. The Democratic Coalition and the Egyptian
Bloc were both engaged in the process of gathering political organizations from different strands
(Islamist, liberal and nationalist for the former, liberal and socialist for the latter). In addition, the
Egyptian Bloc and the Wafd placed national unity at the forefront of their campaigns, arguing the
importance of guaranteeing equal rights for all the citizens, regardless of their religion. Since its
creation, the logo of the Wafd had been the Crescent and the Cross, a symbol of the unity of the
Egyptian  people  in  the  face  of  British  domination.  Nevertheless,  “the  Revolution  Continues”
coalition was the best positioned to claim revolutionary legitimacy at that time.
This coalition was indeed the coming together of six political parties, along with the support of a
coalition of revolutionary youth. Its composition indicated the unity of the Egyptian people and of
the  revolutionary  movement  beyond  the  ideological  divides,  since  some  of  its  members  were
socialists (the Socialist Popular Alliance Party and the Socialist Party of Egypt), some others were
liberals (the Equality and Development Party, the Freedom Egypt Party and the Egyptian Alliance
Party), and one was an Islamist (the Egyptian Current party). Lastly, one of the major components
of this coalition was not actually a party, but a network of young revolutionaries called the Coalition
of the Youth of the Revolution (CYR). Created during the insurrection, this organization was by far
the biggest of the hundreds of youth movements from this time. From the very beginning it brought
together previous organizations such as the leftist 6 April Youth movement, the liberal El-Baradeï
campaign, some young people from the MB, and the Khaled Saeed Facebook group administrators.
By  itself,  the  CYR embodied  the  unity  of  revolutionary  youth,  regardless  of  their  ideological
orientations. It was one of the pillars of the revolutionary electoral coalition, alongside the Socialist
Popular  Alliance  Party  and the  Egyptian Current  party.  The former  was born from an alliance
between a group of left wing students (the Tagdîd) and some dissidents from the Unionist party. It is
the only one within the coalition with strong roots among blue-collar workers. Lastly, the Egyptian
Current  party  was  founded  by  young  dissidents  from  the  MB,  disappointed  by  the  lack  of
revolutionary enthusiasm shown by the Islamist leaders during the eighteen days and thereafter.
It is not only the electoral process that tends to exacerbate the divisions of the people, which were
magnified as a manifestation of pluralism during the time of revolution. Each section of opinion
makes  use  of  its  own  definition  of  the  people  as  a  united  entity,  claiming  to  be  its  true
representative.  Unlike  the  other  coalitions,  “The  Revolution  Continues”  coalition  was  not
dominated  by  a  single  party  or  organization,  but  by  three  movements  with roughly  equivalent
strength, allied with three smaller political parties. Bringing together youth and workers from the
entire political spectrum, this coalition had the more legitimate claim to act as the embodiment of
the people as it had appeared during the uprising and to perpetuate this experience. Nevertheless,
this symbolic source of legitimacy was by far the most important resource at the disposal of the
coalition, who –unlike its adversaries and competitors – was lacking in financial resources, charity
and  religious  networks,  and  significant  leaders.  Beside  this,  some  other  political  parties  (for
instance,  the party of the Democratic Front, the Justice Party) and independent candidates6 had
strong grounds for claiming the revolutionary mantle. As a matter of fact, even the adversaries of
the revolutionary coalition tried to dispute their position in this regard.
The Hierarchization of Social Cleavages and Political Issues
During  the  eighteen-month  period  of  the  SCAF-led  transition,  the  opposition  between  the
proponents of the revolution and the supporters of the old regime became one of the most defining
issues facing the nascent Egyptian political party system, its importance only being overshadowed
by the debate surrounding the religious identity of the state.  If  one of the main slogans of the
eighteen-day uprising was “Bread, freedom and social justice”, such notions were soon eclipsed
within the political arena. Instead, following the various conflicts between the young activists and
the military, the main criteria determining the position of each political player in relation to the
scale of their support for the revolution became the stance taken by these players regarding the
eviction of the military from the heart of the political system. This was followed by other issues
relating to the security apparatus, such as the reform of the police, and also by the recycling of ex-
NDP members. Even if most of the leftist forces supported the social demands of the revolution, the
revolutionary camp accepted within its ranks many advocates of neo-liberal policies. The common
denominator among the revolutionaries was their wish to “civilianize” the Egyptian state.
Indeed, at the heart of these debates was the notion of the “civil state” (dawla madaniya), loosely
defined as being the opposite  of both competing counter-models:  i.e.  the military state  and the
religious state. Due to the vagueness of its definition, the term was of course used by the supporters
of the third way, i.e. between the army and the Islamists, but also by the latter in order to denounce
military  power  and  privileges,  and  by  the  partisans  of  the  old  regime  themselves  in  order  to
emphasize their own role as the supreme guarantor of the neutrality of the state against the Islamist
threat (Blouët & Steuer, 2015). It is no surprise that the two most pressing issues (military/civil and
secular/Islamist) during this period of transition were related to the very nature of the state itself,
considering that this is the most important problem to solve during times of revolutionary crisis.
Economic and social issues are generally perceived to be mainly a matter of public policies, with
institutional  issues  being  related  to  the  setting  of  the  game  rules  and  to  the  writing  of  the
Constitution. Consequently, the place of religion and the role of the army in the institutions were
forcefully discussed after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak. This was especially so in the political field
during the elections, and also in the different constituent committees which have been trying to draft
a new Constitution for the country since that time.
Nevertheless, the 2011–12 elections showed that of these two issues, the Egyptian electorate had
more concerns about the religious issue,  with the most powerful political  parties and coalitions
positioning themselves mainly in relation to this division, while maintaining a certain ambiguity
when it came to the issue of the role of the military within the institutions (Steuer, 2016). On the
other hand, “the Revolution Continues” coalition was born out of a split among the ranks of the
Egyptian Bloc. While the latter positioned itself first and foremost as the champion of the secular
camp in the face of the Islamist forces, and considered revolution-related issues as secondary, “the
Revolution  Continues”  coalition  left  this  alliance  because  of  a  conflict  related  uniquely  to  the
revolutionary concerns: the Egyptian Bloc agreed to endorse some ex-NDP members as candidates
6 For example, the TV anchor Gamila Ismail in Cairo Central. Some of these independent revolutionary candidates
had  been  elected  to  Parliament:  such  as  Amru  El-Chobaki  in  Dokki,  and  Amr  Hamzawi  in  Heliopolis
(Sabaseviciute, 2013).
for the coalition. The revolutionary coalition was thus created around the unique criterion of the
refusal to endorse the felul, which is not related to the Islamist/secularist cleavage, but only to the
revolution/old regime divide. Furthermore, the electoral programme of the revolutionary coalition7
reveals the priorities of its redactors when it came to the hierarchization of political issues. The first
three chapters deal with the reform of the state apparatus, the purge of the supporters of the old
regime from the institutions, and guarantees of rights and freedoms. Only the fourth chapter is
dedicated to the notion of citizenship, and indicates that the coalition belongs to the secular side of
the religious cleavage. Social and economic issues appear in the three following chapters, and the
final ones deal with the problems of corruption and foreign policy. This document shows how the
revolutionary coalition sought to present itself: firstly as democratic, secondly as secular, and lastly
as leftist. Positioning itself first and foremost on the secondary cleavage, the revolutionary coalition
only managed to gain a marginal share of the seats. 
The result of the parliamentary elections –confirmed in this regard by the presidential elections of
2012– established that the hierarchization of the most pressing issues by the Egyptian electorate was
different from that advocated by the revolutionaries. Indeed, the five political parties and coalitions
that gained a higher share of the MP’s seats had made the religious issue their priority: the MB’s
“Democratic Coalition” (42.5 per cent of the seats), the Salafists’ “Islamic Alliance” (25 per cent),
the secular Wafd (7.5 per cent), the Egyptian Bloc (6.9 per cent), and even the Wasat party, which
positioned itself at the centre of this main axis (2 per cent of the seats, with 3.7 per cent of the vote).
With 2.8 per cent of the vote, and only 8 MPs (1.6 per cent of the seats)8, the revolutionary coalition
ranked 6th, followed by the moderately pro-military Reform and Development Party (2.2 per cent of
the vote, and 9 MPs) and the NDP offshoots (altogether: 6.4 per cent of the vote, but only 3.4 per
cent of the seats due to their lack of unity). If we add the results of the Justice Party (0.7 per cent of
the vote, and only 1 MP), we obtain a result that indicates that just 12.1 per cent of the electorate
positioned themselves on the revolutionary/counter-revolutionary axis, with only 3.5 per cent voting
for revolutionary candidates. By contrast, 87.1 per cent of the vote went to parties and coalitions
positioning themselves  on the Islamist/secularist  axis  (among them, 65.3 per  cent  choosing the
Islamist political forces).
In addition, the intransigence of the revolutionary coalition regarding the candidacy issue of ex-
NDP members led to some difficulties when it came to the formation of the candidate lists. The
refusal to accept any felul among their ranks constitutes the origin of the creation of “the Revolution
Continues” coalition, since it represented a core feature of this alliance. Consequently, there was no
leeway for creating an exception. There was at least one case in which this intransigence impeded
the coalition’s efforts to compete effectively in a PR district: in Suez, the prospective head of the
revolutionary coalition list  was a worker trade-unionist,  and a member of the  Socialist  Popular
Alliance Party. But it appeared that in the past, her responsibilities within the workers’ trade-union
federation had led her to become for a while a member of the NDP. For this reason, the other
candidates decided to withdraw from the list, which was consequently canceled. This resulted in the
absence of “the Revolution Continues” in the PR district of this governorate9.
But the most crucial consequence of this positioning was that the revolutionaries were not forced to
7 The electoral programme of the revolutionary coalition (in Arabic) can be downloaded from the following link:
https://thawramostamera.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/program1.pdf (Retrieved on 9 June 2016).
8 But one should add the leader of the Freedom Egypt Party, Amr Hamzawi, who registered as an independent and
was  elected  to  an  individual  seat  in  Heliopolis  (Sabaseviciute,  2013).  Among  the  elected  members  of  the
revolutionary coalition, most of them (7) were members of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party. This is probably a
side effect of the constitutional disposition stipulating that at least half of the MPs should be workers or peasants.
As was the case with the other parties and coalitions, the Revolutionary Coalition lists were usually headed up by a
member emanating from the other social categories. But, when eligible, the revolutionary lists were ranked last, and
then, in order to fill the quota, the second member of the list (who has to be a worker of peasant if none of them had
taken up the first position) was elected to Parliament instead of the head of the list.
9 Nevertheless, the ex-NDP trade-unionist became a candidate of the Socialist Popular Alliance Party for a single-
member seat.
face the same enemies in the street as in the polling booth. While the military and the security
apparatus were the main adversaries of the revolution when it took the form of demonstrations,
strikes and sit-ins, the proponents of the old regime represented a harmless threat in these elections,
which would, in all likelihood, be dominated by Islamist organizations. Many voters felt that the
pressing priority was to defend the secular nature of the state, to the detriment of the objectives of
the revolution, which enemies (the former NDP members) were about to be defeated by the MB and
the Salafists at the ballot  box. Under such circumstances, many electors who were sympathetic
towards the ideas and goals of “the Revolution Continues” coalition preferred to fight the main
threat, and decided to vote strategically for the Egyptian Bloc in order to try and limit the scale of
the Islamist electoral surge.
Difficulties in Articulating the Two Fronts in the Battle for Representation
It is clear that when social and political divisions began to take precedence over the moment of
unity which had characterized the existence of the people in the streets,  the various competing
groups were all tempted to speak in the name of the revolutionary people, even though the latter
concept was fading away, precisely because of competition between the groups which it had once
comprised. Weak at the ballot box, the revolutionary youth organizations were still able to mobilize
in the streets during the whole of the electoral process and, indeed, thereafter. Nevertheless, this
ability constituted a handicap in the electoral competition because of differences in the timing of
electoral  and revolutionary work.  In  addition,  competitors  from the revolutionary organizations
tried to contest their claim to be the representatives of the people, not only at the ballot box, but also
in the streets, as part of an attempt to appropriate their most important –and almost only– resource,
i.e. revolutionary legitimacy.
First and foremost, one should note that the electoral campaign of the revolutionary coalition had
been  jeopardized  by  differences  in  timing  and  issues  existing  between  the  political  and  the
revolutionary activities,  many of its  candidates being involved in the latter  during the electoral
campaign and the election (Wessel, 2013). Indeed, ten days prior to the beginning of the election,
deadly clashes occurred in Tahrir Square between the police and the demonstrators. These events
are known as the “battle of Muhammad Mahmud”, stemming from the name of one of the streets
leading from the square to the Ministry of the Interior, where most of the clashes occurred, with
many demonstrators wanting to attack this symbol of the police apparatus. Dozens of people were
killed during these fights, while tens of thousands of demonstrators occupied Tahrir Square, calling
for the resignation of the SCAF, the transfer of powers to a Committee of Public Salvation and the
reporting of the elections. This crisis was the most important since the ousting of Hosni Mubarak,
and resulted in the dismissal of the government and the solemn promise from the SCAF to transfer
all powers to regularly elected civilians prior to 30 June 2012. For ten days, Tahrir Square once
again  became  the  focus  of  media  attention,  as  well  as  the  centre  of  the  battle  between  the
revolutionaries and the military,  outshining the lure of the elections. For a few days, it  became
almost inconceivable that the vote could take place under such circumstances, and the cancellation
of the electoral process was a strong possibility.
Certain of being the most powerful political force at the ballot box, the MB refused to join the
demonstration, and called for a quick resolution to the crisis in order not to jeopardize or even
postpone their long-awaited victory. This attitude was considered by many revolutionary forces as
being the ultimate betrayal, because they believed that the MB had ruined the chance of removing
the SCAF from the scene and of having the transition managed by civilian power.  Indeed, this
episode contributed to the radicalization of many revolutionaries, who started to claim that elections
organized under a military regime would be illegitimate.  They also began to contest  the whole
transition  process.  This  situation  led  many  revolutionary  candidates  to  freeze  their  electoral
campaigns, or even to withdraw their candidacy, and resulted in many of their supporters boycotting
the elections. From this point forwards, the narrative of a secret agreement between the military and
the Islamist political forces began to impose itself within the revolutionary milieu. The elections
thus began to be interpreted as merely a tool in the hands of these two counter-revolutionary forces,
whose function would be to impede the progress of the revolutionary process and to preserve both
the  political  order  and  social  structures.  Under  such  circumstances,  it  was  difficult  for  the
revolutionary candidates to participate in the electoral process; neither could they denounce it. They
also faced many problems in mobilizing their supporters, who condemned the elections and chose
to fully participate in the demonstrations against the SCAF. Most of them believed that the real
battle was occurring in the streets, with the elections being at best a distraction, and more probably
a lethal trap. Many of those who refused to vote did so in the name of the people, understood as
being an “emotional community”. This was the case for instance with a 6 April activist in Suez,
who told me he had nullified his ballot paper by writing on it: “damm al-shuhadâ’” (“the blood of
the martyrs”).
Eventually, the demonstrations ceased a few days before the beginning of the electoral process,
which started on time. Cairo was one of the governorates to vote during the first phase (of three) of
the elections, and electors went to the polling stations during a precarious truce between the military
power and the revolutionary youth. A few weeks later, while other parts of the country were still in
the process of voting, new clashes erupted in the capital city, involving on this occasion young
demonstrators and the military police, not the forces of the Ministry of the Interior. These events
tarnished the image of the SCAF in the eyes of most Egyptians, especially after the release of a
video showing members of the military police beating up a young woman and tearing her clothes
off while she was on the ground. By that time, the first results of the election were known, and the
protesters were directing their  anger  not  only at  the military power,  but  also at  the anticipated
electoral victory of the Islamists. In Suez, for instance, which voted during the second phase, the
first post-vote projections gave almost 75 per cent of the vote to the Salafists in the governorate.
The revolutionary organizations of this city then organized a protest, officially in solidarity with the
demonstrators in Cairo, but at the same time in order to show they were still present in the streets
and the Salafists were not in control of their city.
Despite the lack of electoral process legitimacy in the eyes of many of their supporters, the leaders
of “the Revolution Continues” coalition maintained support for their candidates and pursued their
campaign. Crippled by the contradiction inherent to their participation in a process they considered
illegitimate,  these  candidates  and  the  activists  campaigning  for  them  were  also  busy  with
“revolutionary work”10, that is to say their involvement in the anti-SCAF demonstrations. Not only
were the revolutionary candidates and activists not devoting their full efforts to the elections, but
only  a  part  of  their  electoral  activities  were  directly  related  to  their  own  campaign.  A large
proportion  of  their  work  consisted  of  defending  the  public  interest  by  playing  the  role  of
“revolutionary  watchdogs” (Meringolo,  2013).  For  instance,  many of  them were  involved in  a
campaign  against  the  “felul”,  the  former  members  of  the  NDP who  were  trying  to  recycle
themselves as independents or candidates of different political parties. This campaign was aimed at
establishing a list of all the  felul competing for seats in Parliament, which would then be shared
with the voters. In addition to, and despite of, their distrust of the electoral process as a whole, many
young revolutionaries took part in the monitoring of the election process, either as members of
registered NGOs or as delegates of political parties.
If the proximity of “the Revolution Continues” coalition with the actual demonstrators served to
reinforce its claim to embody the people, it also constituted a handicap in the electoral competition
because it deprived the coalition of available supporters and time, and also because it placed it in a
contradictory position. Besides this, its pretensions to be the representative of the revolution and the
people was contested by their competitors, not only through their rhetoric and their own claims to
represent national unity, but also through their attempts to appropriate the revolutionary repertoire
of action (Steuer, 2018)11.  Islamist and old regime forces  sought to appropriate this revolutionary
10 “Al-shughl al-thawrî”, to quote a responsible of “the Revolution Continues” campaign in Tanta.
11 The latter was born as a result of the merging of two previously existing repertoires: the “ civil-democratic” (De
Smet, 2014) repertoire and the “workers” repertoire. In this regard, it was participating in the construction of a
repertoire in order to claim some of the revolutionary legitimacy associated with it, and to compete
with the revolutionary forces on their own ground, namely the representation of the people in the
street. For instance, on 29 July 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Nour party occupied Tahrir
Square, demanding the establishment of a religious state. These organizations also sometimes took
part in demonstrations with the revolutionaries, as was the case on 18 November 2011, in order to
remind  the  army  leaders  of  their  promise  to  hand  over  power  to  officially  elected  civilians.
Nevertheless,  these  attempts  were  limited  to  the  occupation  of  Tahrir  Square  and  recourse  to
“revolutionary” rhetoric (social justice, human rights and democracy). One should also mention the
attempts  on  the  part  of  proponents  of  military  power  to  appropriate  some  elements  of  the
revolutionary repertoire, starting with the occupation of an alternative square (Abbasseya) during
the Muhammad Mahmud battle in November 2011. At that time, however, representatives of the old
regime were not claiming to be “the real revolutionaries”, but were merely trying to undermine the
narrative  of  the  unity  of  the  people  by  underlining  the  existence  of  a  division  between  the
demonstrators  and  the  supporters  of  the  military.  This  division  was  made  visible  through  the
occupation of another square, the spatial  divide representing at a symbolic level the underlying
social division between opposing revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries.
Conclusion
If the staging of a people united in its own diversity proved itself a successful strategy during the
eighteen days which resulted in the toppling of President Mubarak in 2011, the same strategy failed
when used in an electoral campaign a few months later. Indeed, the gathering of men and women,
middle-class youth and blue-collar workers, religious and secular individuals, provincials and urban
citizens, liberal political parties and socialist organizations on Tahrir Square allowed the emotional
fusion of an entity designing itself as “the people”, and claiming back its sovereignty confiscated by
the state and the capitalist cronies.
But when “the Revolution Continues” coalition tried to embody this entity by bringing together
liberal,  socialist  and  Islamist  parties,  as  well  as  a  youth  coalition,  it  had  to  compete  in  an
unfavourable environment, where the institutional rules had been set up by its adversaries, which
disposed of formidable resources and solid claims to represent themselves the national community.
At  the  same  time,  their  priorities,  reflecting  their  world-view (“the  people”  v/s  “the  power”),
revealed different from the most pressing issue in the eyes of the electorate: the growing division
between the proponents of an Islamic state and the defenders of a secular state. Then, their failure
helps  us to  understand the concrete  differences opposing the various  conceptions of the people
which coexist and compete each other in the modern societies.
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